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THEIR FORCE AND EFFECT
nm it a & Cw M d Tu Camva
In recent years there has been an
enormous growth in the creation of
trusts of every kind. With the highly
efficient organization of trust companies,
more testators have created trusts by
their wills and family settlement trusts
by trust agreements inter vivos have be-
come quite common. Subdividers of
great tracts of land have found it expedi-
ent to market their title through respon-
sible trustees. Various modern inven-
tions of financing real estate transactions,
notably land trust certificates, require the
medium of a trustee. The ownership of
co-operative apartment buildings is most
effectively accomplished for the benefit
of the co-operative apartment owners by
placing the title of the property in a
trustee, and lastly, many business enter-
prises are now being conducted under
trust agreements known as common law
or Massachusetts trusts. These and a
great variety of other transactions are
bringing the business world more and
more into contact with trustees and the
vast amount of business transacted by
trustees makes it a matter of practical
importance to consider the effect of a
judgment against a trustee; how such a
judgment is enforced; against whom it
may be enforced; and how a trustee may
protect himself from personal liability on
his trust obligations. An exhaustive
search of the books has not disclosed a
great abundance of material on this sub-
ject, but there is sufficient to be able to
make an analysis, which it is hoped may
be useful. In passing, it may be said
that there is no distinction in regard to
the subject under consideration between
a trustee under a will, in a (Iced or a
common law trust agreement.
For convenience, the subject may be
best considered tinder five sub-heads:
1. Is a judgment against a trustee as
such a lien upon the real estate held by
the trustee in his capacity as trustee?
2. May real estate held by the judg-
ient debtor in his capacity as trustee be
sold tinder an execution based upon such
judgment ?
3. Is such a judgment a lien on the
real estate of the judgment debtor owned
by him in his own right?
4. Is there any form of judgment
known to the law under which a judg-
ment creditor may enforce his judgment
against the trust estate?
5. How may a trustee protect himself
from personal liability on his trust ob-
ligations?
Example
Let us suppose for example that John
Doe, duly acting as trustee with the
power 'o borrow money, in the exercise
of his power, borrows the sum of
$1,000.00 and signs his name to a note,
"John Doe, as trustee." He fails to pay
the note, is sued in an action at law,
and a judgment is recovered against him
"as trustee." As' trustee, under the same
trust, John Doe holds the title to real
estate. The judgment debtor causes ex-
ecution to issue upon his judgment,
levies on the real estate held by John
Doe, as trustee, and sells it under the
execution. This example will be re-
ferred to from time to time to illustrate
the various points made in the course
of this discussion.
I and 2
Sub-heads 1 and 2 are so closely con-
nected that they may be discussed prac-
tically as one subject. At the every out-
set it may bc definitely stated that thejudgment given in our example is not a
lien upon the trust property and the
trust property cannot be sold at an ex-
ecution sale.
Before proceeding to a demonstration
of these propositions, it is essential to
constantly bear in mind that trusts are
the subjects exclusively of equity juris-
diction. With this always in mind it is
easy to understand the conclusions here
reached. In general, then, trust property
cannot be subjected to the claims of
creditors by proceedings at law. There
is excluded from this discussion the
matter of judgment liens and execution
sales of real estate, the title of which is
held by a trustee under a secret trust.
Such a title may in Illinois be sold on
execution. In this respect the law of
Illinois is different from the law of other
States. This is due to the wording of
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our recording act. Emmons v. Moore,
85 I1. 308; Home Bank v. Peoria Trot-
ting Society, 206 I1. 11. Some aulltri-
ties will be referred to from other juris-
dictions where secret trusts were in-
volved, but where there was no recording
act. The principles of those antl,,ritie.
are applicable here.
A few quotations from the leading
authorities on this subject will serve top
illustrate that a judgment against a
trustee is not a lien on real estate held by
such trustee in trust. Tius in Huntt v.
Townshend, 31 Md. 3.36, the Supreme
Court of Maryland, referring to a judg-
ment against trustees, said:
"Such a proceeding is a breach of trust,
and a Judgment so confessed is not a lici
upon the trust property."
In Boardman v. Willard, 73 Iowa 20,
the title was in "George F. Woolston.
trustee." A judgment was rendered
against him as trustee. The Court said:
"The judgment was not a lien * * .
for all the plaintiff obtained * * 0 was
a lien on the interest of Woolston. If
he had none, the plaintiff got none."
In Wright v. Franklin Bank, 59 Ohio
State 80, 92, the Court said:
"Judgments against the trustee are not
liens upon the lands held by him in trust
for another."
The holdings of these Courts arc fur-
ther substantiated by the following
authorities: 15 R. C. L. 807; Black on
Judgments, Sec. 421; Hays v. Reger, 102
Ind. 524; Thomas v. Kennedy, 24 Ia. 397.
It being clear, therefore, that a judg-
ment against John Doe, as trustee is not
a lien on real estate which John Doc
holds as trustee, it must inevitably follow
that such real estate cannot be sold on
execution. Indeed this is the law and it
will require very few citations to illus-
trate this.
The leading case is probably Moore v.
Stemmons, 119 Mo. Appeal, 162 in which
a judgment had been recovered against
the trustees in their capacities as trus-
tees. The judgment creditor had caused
an execution to be issued and a levy to
be made upon the trust property. The
proceeding before the Supreme Court
was a motion to quash the execution,
which was granted. The Court said:
"An execution upon a judgment or de-
cree against a trustee cannot be made to
run against trust property."
In Mallory v. Clark, 9 Abbott's Prac-
tice Reports, 358, it was said:
"An execution issued upon a Judgment
cannot be levied upon Lie trust estate."
In Osterman v. Baldwin, 6 Wall. 122,
the Supreme Court of the United States
held that no title would pass by a sale
of trust property under an execution.
The Court said:
-If illman hail th, bare, naked, legal'
fill-, without any Iwneli'lal interest in thepr.qw.rly sold. and no lo.Sesslon, nothing1M. .A by the ni.
)thl r anthorities supporting this prop-
ositin are Lee v. \Vrixon. 37 Wash. 50;
Smith v. McCann, 24 How. 398; 1 Free-
nian opn Exccinions. Sec. 173; 23 C. J. p.
343; Il Am. wnlt Eng. Encyc. of Law. p.
634; Klelper on Judicial and Execution
Sas Sec. 342: and HIusey v. Arnold,
185 Ma-.. 202.
The cases referred to do not all in-
volve judgments which run against the
debtor as trustee. Sonie Involve judg-
ments against the debtors individually,
but as we shall see, there is no difference
between these cases in principle, because
a judgment against "John Doe" and ajudgment against "John Doe, as trus-
tee" have the same force and effect.
They are both personal judgments.
Therefore, the mode of enforcing the
judgments is the same in this-that
neither can be enforced again-it the trust
property by any proceeding at law. In
equity, of course, it becomes a matter of
importance whether the judgment is
based upon the individual liability of
John Doe or whether the debt upon
which it was based was incurred for the
benefit of the trust estate. If it is the
individual obligation of John Doe, in no
event, either at law or in equity, can the
trust estate be subjected to the payment
of the debt. If, however, John Doe in-
curred the debt as trustee within his
powers and for the benefit of the trust
estate (in accordance with our example
given at the outset), while the trust es-
tate cannot at law be subjected to the
payment of the debt, yet in equity it can.
See Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202 and
Zehnbar v. Spillman, 6 Southern 214
(Fla.). The cases are therefore, all in
point, regardless of the form of the judg-
ment. Some of the cases referred to in-
volve almost the identical situation stated
in our example. It is a remarkable fact
that there appears to be no conflict in
the cases found on this subject, from
which it may be seen with what zeal
courts of equity prevent interference
with trusts by courts of law and how
uniformly courts of law apply the prin-
ciple of "hands off" to trust estates.
There is another important considera-
tion in this connection, namely, that the
rights of the beneficiaries are not and
cannot be concluded by a judgment
against a trustee. In such a proceeding
beneficiaries are not parties. To subject
their property to the lien of a judgment
or to a sale upon execution based on a
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judgment rendered in a proceeding at
law in which they had no opportunity to
be heard, would require the amendment
of several constitutions. Black in his
work on judgments in Section 585 says:
"The general rule Is that In all proceed-
ings affecting the trust estate, whether
brought by or against third persons, the
trustee and cestui que trust are so far
Independent of each other that the latter
must be made a party to the suit In order
to be bound by the judgment or decree
rendered therein."
3
We may now proceed to consider what
effect the judgment rendered in our ex-
ample will have on the individual prop-
erty of John Doe. Is the judgment a
lien upon John Doe's individual real es-
tate even though it was incurred pursu-
ant to powers given to John Doe as
trustee and was for the benefit of the
trust estate? The judgment is a lien
upon John Doe's individual real estate.
This follows from the law that the judg-
ment thus rendered is a personal judg-
ment and, of course, it being a personal
judgment, it is enforcible against the in-
dividual property of the debtor, John
Doe. Whatever may be the effect of the
word "as" when placed before the word
"trustee" in the laws of deeds, it is ab-
solutely without force in the law of con-
tracts and judgments. Contracts by or
judgments against "John Doe," "John
Doe, trustee," or "John Doe, as trus-
tee" have the same force and effect.
They are all personal contracts and
judgments. In Duvall v. Craig, 2
Wheat. 45, the Supreme Court of the
United States said:
If a trustee "chooses to bind himself by
a personal covenant, he is liable at law
for a breach thereof in the same manner
as any other person, although he describes
himself as covenanting as trustee, for In
such case the covenant binds him per-
sonally, and the addition of the word 'as
trustee' is but a matter of description
* 0 ,.,"
In Dunham v. Blood, 207 Mass. 512,
the Court said:
"When a trustee. even if le is author.
ized to do so, borrows money in behalf of
his trust and gives a note 'as trustee' tire
note is his individual note * * *."
To the same effect is Carr v. Leahv,
217 -Mass. 440; Taylor v. Davis, 110 .
S. 330; and Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill.,
341.
These authorities establish conclusive-
ly the proposition that a note or con-
tract signed by "John Doe, as trustee"
is his personal note or contract. It
follows, therefore, that a personal judg-
ment not only may be, but is the only
kind which can be rendered against John
Doe. Only three authorities were found
which discussed this point. They were
Hussey v. Arnold, Zehnbar v. Spillman
and Huntt v. Townsend supra. In Hus-
sey's case the Court said:
"Actions at law upon such contracts
must be brought against them and Judg-
ments run against them personally."
In the Zehnbar case, the Court said:
"It Is their personal note and the judg-
ment would be a personal judgment
against them to be satisfied out of their
own property."
And in the Huntt case, the Court
stated :
"ISuch a Judgment can only bind the
individual property of the parties who
confess it."
The creditor of John Doe, who has
secured a judgment against John Doe,
as trustee, is therefore, not without
remedy. He may collect his judgment
against John Doe individually by execu-
tion and sale of John Doe's individual
property. However, the creditor is not
required to sue at law. In our example
the creditor had a more direct remedy.
He could have subjected the trust estate
to the payment of the debt incurred by
the trustee by a proceeding in equity
against the trust property. To this pro-
ceeding in equity the trustee and the
beneficiaries would be made parties de-
fendant. In equity the court may sub-
ject the trust property to the payment
of the debt. Authority, if any be neces-
sary for this point, is found in the few
cases on this subject. We quote again
from .'Fallory v. Clark in which the court
commented on this remedy in these
words:
"An execution of law could never be
maintained to reach the estate by making
the trustee defendant, but for such pur-
pose resort must be had to a proceeding
in equity."
In Hussey v. Arnold supra, the Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts said:
"Such debts, If proper charges upon the
trust estate, can be paid from it under
authority of a court of equity."
In Zehnbar v. Spillman supra, this
language occurs:
"In short, the trust property cannot be
reached except by a proceeding in chan-
cery to which the cestui que trustent
must be nmide parties."
The creditor's remedy is thus two-fold.
He may recover a judgment at law
against John Doe, which is enforcible
against John Doc's individual property
or he may proceed in equity to subject
the trust estate to the payment of the
debt. The question immediately arises
as to John Doe's recourse in the case
where a judgment has been recovered
against him as trustee and he has been
compelled to pay it to avoid an execu-
tion sale of his individual property.
Needless to say, John Doe, as trustee,
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has a remedy against the trust estate.
In our example, he clearly has a remedy
because he had the power to sign the
note and incur the debt upon which the
judgment was rendered. It is obvious
if the creation of the debt was a breach
of trust or he had 'no authority what-
ever for it, John Doe would have no re-
course against the trust property.
The Supreme Court of the United
States in Taylor v. Davis supra com-
ments upon this in the following words:
"Of course, when, a trustee acts in
good faith for the benefit of the trust, he
is entitled to Indemnify himself for his
engagements out of the estate in his hands
and for this purpose a credit for his ex-
penditures will be allowed in his accounts
by the court having jurisdiction thereof."
4
Another question of interest is whether
any form of judgment is known to the
law under which trust property can be
sold at an execution sale based upon a
judgment at law against the trustee. An
analogy might be sought in the prevalent
form of judgments against receivers,
which is made to run against "A. as re-
ceiver, to be paid out of the funds held
by him as receiver." See McNulta v.
Ensch, 134 Il1. 48. A similar form is
used in judgments against executors and
administrators. But due to the jealous
exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of
courts of equity over trusts and trus-
tees, no form of judgment 'Ian be de-
vised which the courts will recognize as
the basis for subjecting trust property to
an execution sale.
Judge Storey said in Duvall v. Craig
supra:
"It is plain * * * there could have been
no other judgment rendered againqt them(the trustees) for at law a Judgment
against a trustee in such special capacity
is utterly unknown."
In Moore v. Stemninons. already re-
ferred to, the judgment against the trus-
tee contained an express direction for
satisfaction of the judgment out of the
trust property. This judgment appar-
ently attempted to follow the form of
judgments used in cases of receivers. In
setting aside the judgment, the Supreme
Court of Missouri said:
"An execution upon a Judgment or de-
cree against time trustee cannot be made to
run against tlhe trust iroperty."
In the Zehinbar case the order for the
issue of the execution directed that exe-
cution be levied upon and collected out
of the trust property. The Supreme
Court of Florida expunged the order
with these words:
"There is no authority of law for such
an order."
In view of these decisions it is safe to
assume that a judgment against "John
Doe, as trustee" is a personal judgmieut
against John Doe, regardless of any
language in the judgment intended to
give it any other effect.
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It remains now to consider one more
aspect of the subject, namely the man-
ner by which a trustee may protect him-
self from personal liability in dealing
with trust matters and incurring debts
on behalf of the trust estate. As has
been before shown, to sign a contract or
note "as trustee" is to incur merely a
personal obligation. But if a trustee
should sign a note "As trustee, and not
individually," he thereby relieves himself
from personal liability and no personal
judgment, in fact, no judgment whatever
should be rendered against him. Any
similar stipulation added to the words
"as trustee" to the effect that the trustee
shall not be personally liable will pro-
tect him. In such case no judgment
should be rendered against the trustee,
but the creditor must resort to a court
of equity and there subject the trust
property to the payment of the debt. Of
course, as before stated, the trust estate
is liable only in the event the trustee
had the power to incur the debt or in-
currcd the debt for the benefit of the
trust estate. If the trustee, however,
even in the face of a stipulation protect-
ing him against personal responsibility,
suffers a judgment to be rendered against
him at law the judgment would be a per-
sonal judgment. The stipulation would
be only a defense against the judgment
before it is entered. If not asserted, the
judgment becomes a valid personal judg-
nient.
This manner of protecting himself
against personal liability is specifically
recognized by the cases. Thus in Carr v.
Leahy, 217 Mass. 440. the court referred
to this method as follows:
"Itf a trustee contracting for the benefit
of a trust wants to protect himself from
individual liability on the contract, he
must stipulate that he is not to be per-
sonally responsible, but that the other
party is to look solely to the trust es-
tate,."
And in Austin v. Parker, 317 I1. 354,
the court said:
...The rule is well settled that a guard-
ian. executor. administrator. trustee, or
other person acting in such relation, in a
contract with third persons hinds himself
personally, unless he exacts an agreementfrom the person with whom he contracts to
look to the funds of the. estate exclusively;
and this is true regardless of whether
the elarge is one for which the trustee
may be reimhursed from the trust estate,
as tlmt Is a matter wholly between him
and the beneficlaries of the trust."
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We may now conclude by summariz-
ing the matters herein considered as fol-
lows:
(1) If the obligation is created by the
trustee within his authority and he pro-
perly limits his liability, then the trustee
cannot be made personally liable, but the
trust estate is liable in equity.
(2) If the obligation is created by- the
trustee within his authority, but he does
not properly limit his liability, then the
trustee is personally liable and a judg-
ment may be rendered against him which
will be a personal judgment. The trus-
tee, if compelled to pay the judgment,
may require the trust estate to reimburse
him. The creditor may also pursue the
trust estate in equity if he chooses.
(3) If the obligation is created by the
trustee without authority, then he is, of
course, personally liable and the trust
estate can under no circumstances be
subjected to the payment of the obliga-
tion.
(4) In no event can any of the obli-
gations of the trustee be enforced against
the trust estate at law.
THE ROUIND TABLE
Its History and Origin
In the fall of 1925 a small number of
freshmen met at regular intervals for
purposes of review and discussion of the
subjects studied in class. This continued
for some time and as we delved deeper
into law we discovered that all ques-
tions could not be solved intelligently
with our existing knowledge of juris-
prudence. We soon found ourselves de-
bating problems that led us into col-
.lateral fields and being only freshmen
we realized the necessity of consulting
instructors who gladly furnished us with
the necessary information.
After a year of experimentation in
this method of study we felt that it was
extremely beneficial to us and upon en-
tering our second year we were begin-
ning to look around for other earnest
students to partake with this little group.
Towards the end of 1926 our contacts
were broadened with students as well as
teachers and when this group could not
agree on a question of law then under
discussion some of us consulted Judge
Pickett whose solutions satisfied all of
US.
As we progressed in our studies we
improved in our discussions but at times
an impartial observer would find as many
different opinions as there were members
in this group. Some were then begin-
ning to feel that an adviser who could
reconcile our views and who could guide
us through the complexities of law was
indispensable. Up to this time among
those frequently consulted was Judge
Pickett and one suggested that perhaps
the Judge would consent to be a perma-
nent adviser. He demurred to this on
the ground that it might interfere to too
great an extent with his regular work in
the school. He agreed to do his part,
however, in conjunction with other mem-
bers of the faculty. This favorable ar-
rangement secured, the little group con-
cluded to invite other students who were
capable of taking advantage of Judge
Pickett's informal little talks which were
so ably presented and so enthusiastically
received. Enthusiastically because each
member expressed his view point openly
and honestly without fear of being
marked one way or another. And when
a student's opinion suggested a point of
law the Judge would lead him on until
such student would conclude with a
definite rule of law which as a result
indelibly impressed itself upon the minds
of all students.
The next problem facing us was the
method of choosing new members into
this round table. After a number of
ways were suggested we felt that there
would be more certainty of obtaining
the desired students by referring to their
grades and inviting those who had re-
ceived at least a B plus average.
The first addition was made at the
March meeting when the following, all
of whom had received credit in the school
for approximately 25 semester hours'
work, were elected to membership, M.
W. Thompson, C. H. Edwards, Donald
Wick, Hugh E. Johnson, Arthur Jep-
son, and Irving S. Toplon.
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Its Aims and Purposes
The facts and circumstances surround-
ing the formation of the Round Table
having been explained, the purposes in-
herent in its formation become obvious.
Those purposes, as conceived by the
members of the groups are elucidated
here.
The first and most obvious purpose of
the formation of the Round Table is to
allow its members an additional oppor-
tunity for social contact with their class-
mates, regardless of fraternity, club, or
other affiliations. Friendships will be
formed among us which will be lasting.
,These friendships will be cemented by
Iinn bands of common interest. We are
all law students. We all seek further
knowledge of the law, which we will be
able to get through the Round Table.
The acquisition of such further knowl-
tdge will be facilitated by participation
in a group formed upon a basis of ex-
change if ideas, especially since our
Round Table discussions are presided
over by one wise both in substantive
and adjective law, and who is ever will-
ing to separate the chaff from the wheat
for our benefit. Under such circum-
stances our ideas of the law will become
mose definite, and better organized, and,
as one's ability to express one's thoughts
is in direct proportion to the, clarity of
the thought, we shall be better able to
state our knowledge of the law in clear,
concise, convincing form.
It is also anticipated that before very
long the Round Table will make its mark
on classroom discussion and school
work. The Round Table is composed
of members of all sections in the school,
and with two or three members of the
Round Table in each class to delve more
deeply into our subjects, other members
of the classes will be benefitted Py the
more comprehensive treatment of that
particular branch of the law.
The last, but 'not the least, result
which will follow the formation of the
Round Table is that Post Graduate work
will be stimulated by membership in the
group activities. Experience teaches us
that as one's knowledge of a subject in-
creases, the more knowledge one desires
on that particular subject. We hope this
is no exception. Every member of the
Round Table is a potential candidate
for a Post Graduate course. These
thoughts guided us in the formation of
the Round Table.
To build up and maintain an organi-
zation, which will be a real and vital
force in maintaining the highest schol-
astic standards of the legal profession,
is a task worthy of the best in each and




IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T BE-
LIEVE IT, READ, READ
AGAIN
The mule-he is a gentle beast,
And so is man.
He's satisfied to be the least;
And so is man.
Like man, he may be taught some tricks;
He does his work from eight to six;
The mule-when he gets mad, he kicks;
.And so does man.
The mule, he has his faults, 'tis true;
And so has man.,
He does some things he should not do;
And so does man.
Like man, he doesn't yearn for style,
But wants contentment all the while,
The mule-he has a lovely smile;
And so has man.
The mule is sometimes kind and good;
And so is man.
He eats all kinds of breakfast food;
And so does man.
Like man, he balks at gaudy dress
And all outlandish foolishness;
The mule's accused of mulishness;
And so is man.
